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The first chapter, Advocacy NGOs, develops a theoretical model in which
NGOs financed by foreign donors engage in two types of activities in a developing
country: service provision and advocacy. In the model, service provision relieves
poverty, but these aid resources risk embezzlement by corrupt authorities. Ad-
vocacy can encourage the local population to demand more transparency to the
authorities, reducing embezzlement at the cost of investing fewer efforts in direct
poverty alleviation. We find that in general advocacy will be under-provided
because its benefit, improved governance, has the characteristics of a public
good. NGOs can remedy to this under-provision by coordinating their actions,
but because this coordination threatens the rents of the local authorities, offi-
cials will respond to coordination attempts by cracking down on NGOs. Full
coordination is therefore undesirable: crackdown of NGOs will be too strong,
which reduces service provision and hurts beneficiaries.
The second chapter, Discontinuity of Preferences and Insurance Demand:
Results from a framed field experiment in Burkina Faso, explores how discontin-
uous preference over certain and uncertain outcomes have a dampening effect on
the insurance demand. The intuition is that if agents exhibit a disproportionate
preference for certain outcomes, they would undervalue uncertain insurance in-
demnity payments compared to certain premium cost and exhibit lower demand
for insurance compared to a classic expected utility maximizer. Inspired by the
seminal work of Andreoni and Sprenger, we design games to identify agents with
a disproportionate preference for certain outcomes and play them with cotton
farmers in Western Burkina-Faso. We then provide experimental evidence that
this is a powerful framework to understand demand for micro-insurance. Specif-
ically, we show that agents with discontinuous preference respond positively to
an alternative presentation of a classic insurance contract: they are willing to
pay more for a given contract if the premium cost is artificially made uncertain
by being directly deducted from indemnity payments. We also explore alter-
native behavioral arguments such as loss aversion, but argue that they offer
less appealing framework to understand the full set of our results. Our results
have practical implications for the design of insurance contracts. \par The third
chapter, Learning and Channels of Infomration Transmission: The adoption of
Genetically modified cotton in Burkina Faso, investigates the role of learning
in the adoption and dis-adoption of a new agricultural technology. Using a
household panel dataset containing detailed informations on the adoption of
genetically modified (GM) cotton seeds varieties, we present evidences on how
farmers’ decisions to adopt and dis-adopt a new agricultural technology depend
on social learning and on learning by doing. We find that, in general, in the
process of adoption, farmers evaluate more the information signal coming from
their own experience with the new technology than the one of their information
network. In particular, we find that the experience of other farmers can only be
complementary to individual farmers’ experience. Moreover, thanks to detailed
informations concerning the first year in which the technology has been in use,
we are able to identify the characteristics of the first adopters and the chan-
nel of information transmission between farmers. In particular, we find that big
producers are the first one to adopt the new technology, but leader farmers have
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a strategic role in the information transmission from big producers to ordinary
farmers.
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